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Margaret Movshin Criscuola

Originality, Realism and Morality:
Three Issues in Sir Walter Scott's
Criticism of Fiction

loan Williams, in his admirable edition of Sir Walter Scott on
Novelists and Fiction,l has done readers of Scott a great service. Scott's prefaces to Ballantyne's Novelist's Library,
later published separately as The Lives of the Novelists~ and
the best of his reviews of contemporary tales, now may be puzzled through in convenience. This reader has become convinced
in the process that Scott had a more consistent theory of fiction than he is usually given credit for, perhaps because it
is more closely related to the thought of his Enlightenment
predecessors than to that of his Romantic contemporaries. The
aim of this paper is to tease out of Scott's multifarious
criticism some of its underlying assumptions.
The enterprise may seem quixotic, for although Scott's
critical judgment is frequently praised, its good qualities
are traced generally to a temperamental rather than an intellectual origin, and so placed beyond our analysis or emulation. Williams dubs Sir Walter "a practical rather than a
theoretical critic,,,2 and concludes that "temperamental inadequacy ••• prevented him, in spite of his capacity to perceive
the practical aspects of a work of art, from making any major
advance in the theory of the novel" (Williams, p. 6). Margaret Ball covered in her study of Sir Walter Scott as a Critic
of Literature 3 the wide range of Scott's work as editor and
biographer of Swift and Dryden, folklorist, and critic of poetry as well as of fiction, but made no attempt to test its
logical coherence. John Lauber, noting that Scott's criticism
of novels "surpasses, in both quantity and importance, the
work of any previous or contemporary critic of fiction,tll!
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points out the difficulties Scott's statements raise in his
seemingly philistine value for novelty, separation of plot
and character, weakness in dealing with technique, and rejection of the moral importance of the novel. Still it seems
worthwhile to seek the principles, unformalized as they are,
behind the "balance and moderation" (Williams, p. 11), "large
fresh sanity,"S "flexible ••• application of catholic ••• taste,
qualities rare in the partisan and dogmatic periodical criticism of the time,,,5 and too rare at any time not to have had
some foundation in theory. Besides, the work of Duncan Forbes 7
on Scott's intellectual antecedents in the school of the Scottish Enlightenment suggests new sources of analogous theory
to assist this investigation. And in Scott's criticism (barring his comments in prefaces to the Waverley Novels, spoken
"according to the trick" and unreliable for present purposes)
we do find recurring terms which mark central issues. Originality and variety; human nature, romance, and novel; and
morality: Scott returns to these again and again.
Let us begin as Scott usually does with originality--a
"rare and valuable property" (Williams, p. 77) which he seldom fails to assess in the novelists who come under his scrutiny. He grants it to Henry McKenzie because "the sources to
which he resorts to excite our interest are rendered accessible by a path peculiarly his own" (Williams, p. 77); that is,
he attains the "pathetic effect" he shares with Richardson and
Sterne by a new method: "the reader's sympathy is excited by
the effect produced on one [character] of the drama," rather
than by Richardson's "combination of minutely traced events"
or Sterne's "wild, fanciful, beautiful flight of thought and
expression" (Williams, p. 78). The pursuit of new effects is
also original; for Ann Radcliffe invents a new "species of
romance" by "an appeal. •• to the passion of fear, whether excited by natural dangers,or by the suggestions of superstition" nUlliams, p. 110). In these and other such comments,
form appears as the first measure of originality, and Scott
speaks of a novelist's originality much as he did of Swift's:
There was indeed nothing before his time which
could serve for his model, and the few hints
which he has adopted from other writers bear no
more resemblance to his compositions than the
green flax to the cable which is formed from it. S
Scott frankly couples originality with providing a formal model
to later authors when he describes Walpole's Castle of Otranto as "the original and model of a peculiar species of composition" (Williams, p. 87) and refers testily to Mrs. Radcliffe's
many imitators (Williams, p. 111).
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Scott equated originality with the invention of a new "species" or "style" or "variety"--the terms are used synonymously
--of composition. Williams has noted that Scott was "remarkably free in his approach to work of 'kinds' which would or
would not have been recognized by earlier and more schematic
critics" (Williams. p. 17). Scott had good reason to welcome
new species of prose fiction; it was obviously a new and rapidly growing genre in which he himself was a leading innovator. The publication of Ballantyne's Novelist's Library itself may be seen as an attempt to preserve examples of peculiar kinds of fiction as a record of the growth of the genre.
Scott's enthusiasm for new varieties may also have had a more
strictly theoretical basis; at least. it strongly resembles
the ideas of Alexander Gerard's Essay on Genius which appeared
the year before Scott's birth. Gerard. following Hume's associative psychology. held that the characteristic quality of
genius was invention or originality, which is to be seen not
in perfection of work, but in the creation of "some new work,
different from those of his predecessors, though not perhaps
excelling them •••• "9 Scott agrees with Gerard in finding the
introduction of a new literary kind the true yardstick by
which to measure genius.
Scott shows his interest in new species of fiction in three
distinct ways. First, he believes a critic must understand
the kind of a work, even when the work is first of its kind,
to evaluate it fairly. Defending Ann Radcliffe's Gothic romance, he attacks the criticism·
which would undermine the fair name of an accomplished writer, by showing that she does not
possess the excellence proper to a style of composition totally different from that which she
has attempted. The question is neither, whether
the romances of Mrs. Radcliffe possess merits
which her plan did not require, nay, almost
excluded; nor whether hers is to be considered
as a department of fictitious composition, equal
in dignity and importance to those where the great
ancient masters have long pre-occupied the ground.
The real and only point is, whether. considered as
a separate and distinct species of writing, that
introduced by Mrs. Radcliffe possesses merit, and
affords pleasure •••• (Williams. p. 112)
This statement stands in firm opposition to criticism by preestablished kinds. Scott's practice is to deduce from the
works he inspects their general aims and methods and to use
these as standards for judging all aspects of the works--a
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delicate procedure which any 'new Critic' can appreciate.
Aware of her purpose after candid reading, he can praise the
way Radcliffe's "materials ••• and the means employed in conducting the narrative. are all selected with a view to the
author's primary object" (Williams, p. 114). He can even detect elements which mar the effect, such as the author's own
"rule .•. that all the circumstances of her narrative, however
mysterious. and apparently superhuman, were to be accounted
for on natural principles, at the winding up of the story"
(Williams, p. 115). Previously accepted norms and even injudicious standards erected by the author should, Scott believes,
give way to the attainment of an effect upon the reader.
Since each kind has its own effect, the proliferation of
kinds represents an enlarging of readers' possibilities; thus
the genre becomes adapted to the tastes of more and more diverse readers. Scott judges Radcliffe's works ultimately on
whether they "afford pleasure." and in the same spirit he accepts their unconventionality because "the infinite variety of
human tastes requires different styles of composition for their
gratification" (Williams, p. 112; cf. pp. 77 and 124). Here
is no single human nature, no ideal reader, but instead many
ordinary mortals who are to enjoy the works the critic discusses, and whose actual experience is far more important than
his judgments. The critic's task is to see what is there, to
point out, for instance, the gloomy tone of Charlotte Smith's
works, realizing that it "may be a reconnnendation, or the contrary, as it affects readers of various temperaments, or the
same reader in a different mood of mind" (Williams, p. 188).
Behind this "practical" acceptance of the diversity of readers
lies a Humean belief in connnon mental processes diversified by
particular experiences, which enable people to share in great
works of universal appeal and also to enjoy peculiar literary
experiences without being necessarily corrupt or degenerate.
The second form of Scott's interest in variety is an appreciation of diversity for its own sake. He states:
We ••• behold, that not only each star differs from
another in glory, but that there is spread over the
face of Nature a boundless variety; and that as a
thousand different kinds of shrubs and flowers, not
only have beauties independent of each other, but
are more delightful from that very circumstance
than if they were uniform, so the fields of literature admit the same variety ••.• (Williams. p. 112)
Nowhere does Scott differ more from modern critics than in
this love of variety. It leads him to what would now be considered a preposterous comparison of Smollett with Fielding,
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in which Fielding's "superior taste" is balanced or even outweighed by the "more inexhaustible richness of invention" of
Smollett:
In comparison with his sphere, that in which
Fielding walked was limited, and compared with
the wealthy profusion of varied character and
incident which Smollett has scattered through
his works, there is a poverty of composition
about his rival. (Williams, p. 66)
Here again Scott seconds Gerard, who found "comprehensiveness
of imagination" the first quality of genius, so that a "work
of real genius always proclaims ••• that immense quantities of
materials have been collected by fancy, and subjected to the
author's choice."IO
Thirdly, Scott as an historian of prose fiction evidently
saw in diversity a principle of growth. He does not describe
the novel's history as a gradual discovery of a single set of
formal possibilities, although he traces the methods of individual authors back to their origins, noting LeSage's debt to
Cervantes (Williams, p. 120), Smollett's to LeSage (Williams,
p. 57), and Jane Austen's rich inheritance from their school
of realism (Williams, p. 230). Instead, his overviews of the
genre most frequently take the form of classifications. For
instance, in a review of works of E. T. A. Hoffman, Scott
categorizes the uses of the supernatural in fiction, differentiating among a variety of authors' peculiar effects, and
displaying the original points of each. Throughout the Lives
of the Novelists, Scott sees the work of his eighteenth-century forebears as a host of inventions, great and small, some
incompatible with others, but all comprising a range of possibilities wider and richer than a single form could offer. The
social thought of the Scottish moralists was dominated by the
idea of social progress through an ever-increasing specialization and division of labor.II Scott has brought a similar
idea into the discussion of literature: the genre grows by
diversifying.
Originality and variety--the terms seem to lead Scott's
criticism toward complete relativism and confusion. They are,
however, tied to another which Scott can invoke as a standard;
for he links true originality and invention with a "knowledge
of the human heart" or of "human nature," with "the accurate
power of examining and embodying human character and human
passion, as well as the external face of nature" (Williams,
p. 67). What this knowledge may be we will consider in a
moment. First it is important to note Scott's conviction that
it resulted from the work of intellect, not from feeling or
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intuition. He makes this point firmly and fully in his account of Dryden's genius, which he saw distinguished by "the
power of reasoning, and of expressing the result in appropriate language.,,12 Scott held that
This power of ratiocination, of investigating,
discovering, and appreciating that which is
really excellent, if accompanied with the necessary command of fanciful illustration, and elegant expression, is the most interesting quality
which can be possessed by a poet. 13
Expression and illustration are merely "extrinsic qualities"
of poetry; the "vivifying spirit" by which readers are affected is sup~lied by the intellectual "powers of observation and
deduction" 4 of the poet, which are exactly identical to "the
talents that led Bacon into the recesses of ~hilosophy, and
conducted Newton to the cabinet of Nature."l
Alexander Gerard, too, found no difference in kind between the faculty "for
producing original works of art" and that "for making new discoveries in science •••• "16 By the time the Life of Dryden was
published, Lockhart's notes to a later edition show, this idea
had become to an English reviewer at least, quite incomprehensible;l~ yet Scott pronounces it unhesitatingly and matterof-factly. And this conception of poetic power as the power
of reasoning from observation helps us make sense of Scott's
otherwise bewildering liberality in the matter of "human nature."
Scott considered the most diverse fictions as revealing
knowledge of humanity, and the knowledge assumes as many forms
as there were forms of fiction. Richardson was "a cautious,
deep, and minute examinator of the human heart," (Williams,
p. 40) as were Sterne and Mackenzie; Fielding achieved "the
extended familiarity with the English character, in every rank
and aspect, which has made his name immortal as a painter of
national manners" (Williams, p. 46); Smollett understood professional character, and was also "a searcher of dark bosoms"
(Williams, p. 67). Robert Bage and Mary Shelley explore human thought; John Galt and William Godwin delve into superstition and extraordinary mental states and so create the
"novel of character" (Williams, p. 299). Even works such as
Walpole's Castle of Otranto which employ supernatural machinery may still provide an "accurate display of human character"
(Williams, p. 85). And reviewing his own Old Mortality and
The Black Dwarf, the Author of Waverley finds that their "delineation of the manners and characters" of past times, and
"faithful representation of general nature" earn their author
a place "on the bench of the historians of his time and coun-
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try" (Williams, p. 256). In fact, the many kinds of "knowledge of human nature" which Scott found in the fiction he
reviewed, and which we would now classify as psychology, social psychology, sociology, and ethics, in his day formed the
single study of "moral philosophy." Scott took seriously the
idea that fiction could contribute to this large area of study;
indeed, in his comments the value of these works of literature
seems at times in greater danger of being overlooked than their
interest as investigations of human life.
We have now reached a much-debated issue in Scott's criticism and fiction--that of the novel (or realism) and romance.
These are the only critical terms for which Scott gives formal
definitions: Romance is "fictitious narrative in prose or
verse; the interest of which turns upon marvellous and uncommon incidents;" Novel is "fictitious narrative, differing from
the Romance, because the events are accommodated to the ordinary train of human events, and the modern state of society."18
Yet these are not distinct terms as Scott uses them. Richardson, for instance, is said to have broken from romance, tearing "from his personages those painted vizards, which concealed, under a clumsy and affected disguise, every thing like
the natural lineaments of the human countenance" '(Williams,
p. 22). Still, his works are "but a step from the old romance
••• still dealing in improbable incidents, and in characters
swelled out beyond the ordinary limits of humanity" (Williams,
p. 52). Fielding and Smollett offer more complete examples of
the "minor-romance, or English novel" (Williams, p. 57), at
least until Jane Austen achieves the full potential of the
novelist's art, "keeping close to common incident, and to such
characters as occupy the ordinary walks of life" (Williams,
p. 231). The investigation of human nature lies in the province of the novel, not the romance. But clearly, romance and
novel are historical terms for Scott, and achieve meaning only
in the light of new inventions in fiction. The inventions he
inspects in The LiVes of the Novelists, moreover, include not
only the realistic novel, but also new kinds of romance and
new accommodations between the two types.
A scholarly article on Romance for the Encyclopedia Britannioa shows Scott's mature views on romance. He recounts its
history as a progress from historical tradition, which in "a
very few generations"19 loses its accuracy to marvellous additions, through the naive tale which embodies the fashions of
its times without the author's conscious intent,20 to a more
sophisticated form, "written for a more advanced stage of society" which "demanded, at the hand of those who professed to
entertain them, some insight into nature, or at least into
manners ••.• "21 The novel's scrutiny of common life and character is the furthest point of this progress.
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Yet throughout this history of realism a second force is
acting--a countervailing taste for incident, suspense, and excitement, the "love of the marvellous, so natural to the human
mind •••• "22 Scott quotes with approval Southey's conclusions
about the universality of this taste:
••• man has his intellectual as well as his bodily
appetites, and these things are the food of his
imagination and faith. They are found wherever
there is language and discourse of reason, in other
words, wherever there is man. And in similar stages
of civilization, or states of society, the fiction
of different people will bear a corresponding resemblance, notwithstanding the difference of time
and scene. 23
Scott gradually came to believe that even specific plot-lines
--for instance, that of the king in disguise who exchanges a
pledge with a subject--may have universal appea1.2~ Of this
he was certain: that romance of all forms relied for its acceptance on an intrinsic "universal charm of narrative" (Williams, p. 226). Incident artfully combined, however inherently improbable, appeals to a reader's imagination and anticipation with the "and then" movement E. M. Forster describes
so witti1y.25 So romance is general in interest, always amusing--and never instructive.
Some fictions put the appeal of romance to the service of
the discovery of human nature. Swift's Gulliver's Travels and
Johnson's Rasselas which modern critics hold to be openly
didactic ana1ogues 26 rather than novels, and Mary Shelley's
Frankenstein all aim "less to produce an effect by means of
the marvels of the narrations, than to open new trains and
channels of thought" (Williams, p. 261). These works "suppose the existence of the most extravagant fictions, in order
to extract from them philosophical reasoning and moral truth"
(Williams, p. 326). The reader suspends disbelief and "grants,
for the time of perusal, the premises on which the fable depends" (Williams, p. 90); in return, the author provides him
with the same knowledge of humanity to be found in works of
more realistic method. The Voyage to Brobdingnag, for instance, "exhibits human actions and sentiments as they might
appear" to giants (Williams, p. 147); that to the Houyhnhnms
shows man "such as he may be found in the degraded ranks of
every society, when brutalized by ignorance and gross vice"
(Williams, p. 150). Robinson Crusoe on his imaginary island
becomes
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an example of what the unassisted energies of an
individual of the human race can perform ••• acting
and thinking precisely as such a man must have
thought and acted in such an extraordinary situation. (Williams, p. 180)
Only to John Bunyan and Edmund Spenser does Scott ascribe
downright allegory and the presentation of a moral truth distinct from factual observation of one of the many aspects of
human nature.
Romance is uninstructive usually because it sacrifices
character to incident; its characters cannot be expanded and
individualized without disarranging the neat vicissitudes of
plot. In Radcliffe's romances, for example, "our curiosity is
too much interested about the evolution of the story to permit
our feelings to be acted upon by the distresses of the hero or
heroine. ,,2.7 Contrariwise, Scott finds that his own plots suffer precisely when he creates his most successful characters
(Williams, p. 457). Dryden, when unable to use the "bold and
impetuous characters he delighted to draw,,,28 fell back on
"generic representation[s] of •.• certain c1ass[es] of men or
women,,,2.9 and in place of "moral and sentimental passion," of
which he knew little, substituted "the absurd, unnatural, and
fictitious refinements of romance.,,30 Scott assumes here that
romance, the customary, even universal, turns of plot, will
occur to all writers in distress. Gerard, too, expects such
lapses from originality; when the principles of imagination
are weak,
they will call in memory to their aid. Unable to
guide our steps in an unknown country they keep
in the roads to which they have been accustomed;
and are directed in suggesting ideas, by the connexions which we remember. 31
Originality as Scott and Gerard conceive it presupposes a
crude base of conventional assumptions and forms from which
the new arises and is distinguished. For Scott, this base is
romance.
So Scott watches with interest as Maturin outgrows romance
in favor of his own more valuable "feeling and conception of
character," and attempts
a different and more interesting model, pretending
to the merit of describing the emotions of the human
heart, rather than that of astonishing the reader by
the accumulation of imaginary horrors, or the singu-

38

MARGARET MOVSHIN CRISCUOLA
1ar combinations of marvellous and perilous adventures • (Williams, p. 273)

Burke's sublime, which acts upon the reader so powerfully by
curiosity and terror, is not for Scott the noblest literary
effect. Works which attempt no intellectual discovery, those
like Mrs. Radcliffe's which display neither "the command of
the human passions, nor the insight into the human heart, nor
the observation of life and manners, which recommend other
authors in the same line" (Williams, p. 119), are only amusements, distractions. Scott defends them in these terms:
Perhaps the perusal of such works may, without injustice, be compared with the use of opiates, baneful, when habitually and constantly resorted to,
but of most blessed power in those moments of pain
and of 1angour, when the whole head is sore, and
the whole heart sick. (Williams, p. 105)
The defense is harsher than many attacks.
The novel is a very different fi.ctional p.ossibility. First,
though the chief charm of romance lies in the tricks and turns
of plot, fiction can dispense with this "added beauty" (Williams, p. 52). Scott weighs its value thus:
few of the merits which a novel usually boasts are
to be preferred to an interesting and well-arranged
story. But then this merit, however great, has
never been considered as indispensable to fictitious narrative. On the contrary, in many of the
best specimens of that class of composition--Gil
Blas, for example, Peregrine Pickle~ Roderick
Random, and many others of the first eminence-no effort whatever is made to attain the praise
belonging to a compact system of adventures ••••
(Williams, pp. 187-8)
Again and again Scott asks, "What is the use of the plot but
to bring in fine things?" (Williams, p. 188; also pp. 239,
454) Incidents in a novel may resemble pearls in a strand
(Williams, p. 188), or "the pictures in a showman's box"
(Williams, p. 172; also p. 239), and be merely strung together. In Scott's estimation, the plot of Emma is "extricated
with great simplicity" upon a "simple plan" (Williams, p. 234),
for its "train of mistakes and embarrassing situations, and
dialogues at balls and parties of pleasure" (Williams, p .234)
carries no intrinsic interest as events. It brings in fine
things: Austen's "peculiar powers of humour and knowledge of
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human life" (Williams, p. 234). This novelist has abjured the
genuine though conventional effects of romance plotting and
characterization,
neither alarming our credulity nor amusing our
imagination by wild variety of incident, or by
those pictures of romantic affection and sensibility, which were formerly as certain attributes
of fictitious characters as they are of rare occurrence among those who actually live and die.
(Williams, p. 230)
Instead, Austen has chosen "the art of copying from nature as
she really exists in the common walks of life, and presenting
to the reader ••• a correct and striking representation of that
which is daily taking place around him" (Williams, p. 230).
For Scott the art of copying from nature, in Austen's work
and that of other novelists, is the creation of characters
securely placed in a general scheme and also particularized by
exceptional details so as to appeal as individuals. Scott
praises his own ability to "separate those traits which are
characteristic from those that are generic" and so to represent both "the manners of the times" and "individuals as they
thought and spoke and acted" (Williams, pp. 256-7). Smollett,
analyzing character by profession, has "diversified" his "seaCharacters," "distinguishing the individual features of each
honest tar, while each possesses a full proportion of professional manners and habits of thinking" so that "we at once acknowledge them as distinct persons, while we see and allow
that everyone of them belongs to the old English navy" (Williams, p. 68). Such characters are even historically informative (Williams, p. 68). And they are interesting: Smollett's
particularized evil-doer, Ferdinand Count Fathom, "is a living
and existing miscreant from whom we shrink," while Fielding's
Jonathan Wild, "a cold personification of the abstract principle of eVil," becomes "absolutely tiresome" as a character
(Williams, p. 67). General characters may have "truth and
force" (Williams, p. 188) and may be positively informative,
as Richard Cumberland's "generic" sailors, Spaniards, Jews and
Quakers are (Williams, p. 215); but they evince their authors'
"power[s] of ratiocination" without the "command of fanciful
illustration"S2 which should embody the fruit of observation.
Individualizing, "unless the author is powerfully gifted with
the inventive faculty, is more likely to produce monsters than
models of composition" (Williams, p. 188).
Particularization and generalization were the subjects of
much Enlightenment aesthetic debate. Reynolds in the Discourses urges the artist to "look only on those general habits
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which are every where and always the same,"33 and "not to run
into particularities.,,34 The generalizing "great style" has
an offshoot, "original or characteristical style,,,35 marked by
peculiarities of the artist's own temperament, such as Salvator Rosa's works, of a "rude and wild character,,35 which Scott
likened to the romances of Mrs. Radcliffe (Williams, p. 109).
Reynolds reluctantly recognized a third style, that of the
Dutch painters who show "their own people engaged in their own
peculiar occupations" and "exhibit all the minute particularities of a nation differing •.. from the rest of mankind." 37
Scott compares Jane Austen's novels to Flemish painting (Williama, p. 285). Reynolds evidently considers the three styles
as distinct alternatives; but the Scots thinkers Alexander
Gerard and James Beattie reconcile them much as Scott does.
Gerard holds that the genius draws his generalizations from
experience and embodies them in particularized creations in a
single imaginative act. 38 Beattie, his follower, distinguishes them as complementary processes, generalization being the
foundation and individualization the completion of the artist's work: "Homer's heroes are all valiant, yet each displays a modification of valour peculiar to himself," and the
great poet lets us "know every particular that can be known" 39
about them. Scott's acceptance of both particular and general
characters, and his preference for the former, appears very
similar to Beattie's, based on an idea of the poetic process
as observation, deduction, and illustration of the deductive
categories in unique examples. The apparent contradictions
of Scott's strictures on characterization thus dissolve into
an orderly theory of representation.
Characterization is for Scott verity; verisimilitude is a
mimicking in the narrative texture of the artist's process of
thought. We may see this in Scott's descriptions of two basic
techniques of verisimilitude. The first is detai1--"circumstantial detail of minute, trivial, and even uninteresting
circumstances" (Williams, p. 42)--which disguises fiction as
real, imprecise and subjective observation. This is so because
small and detached facts form the foreground of
a narrative when told by an eyewitness •.• just as
a musket-shot, passing near the head of a soldier,
makes a deeper impression on his mind, than all
the heavy ordnance which has been discharged throughout the engagement. (Williams, p. 154)
The narrative, in short, takes the shape of the associative
principles of a single mind. Thus Richardson's prolixity
(Williams, p. 43) and Defoe's "deficiencies of style" (Williams, p. 173) may become assets, suggesting the foibles of
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real story-tellers. The careful knitting of incidents and
characters may even detract from verisimilitude (Williams,
p. l80)!

Detail, in this view, produces verisimilitude by setting up
a point-by-point comparison between the fiction and the reader's own methods of observation. A narrative persona, representing ordinary people's habits of speech and thought, not
only provides a study in psychology, but also vouches for the
truth of the rest of the tale. Itstruth--as what? Obviously
not as a logical exploration of potentialities, but as genuine
observation, unavoidably complex and partial. Neat plotting
and authorial control would reduce this complexity--so Scott
is willing to sacrifice them to what he believes is a leading
truth of human life. We see in his joy in variety the same
belief: that the world is too rich for anyone mind to order,
or anyone literary form to limn.
Scott recognizes that the unity of the story suffers from
the detail necessary for verisimilitude, so to repair the damage he suggests the dramatic method of narrative. 40 The reader takes the place of observer (filled by the persona of
earlier fiction) and is "compelled to gather the meaning of
the scene from what the dramatis personae say to each other"
without authorial explanation (Williams, p. 239). The "characters ••• evolve themselves with dramatic effect," and the
scope for "minute detail" might be too wide (Williams, p. 235).
Unfortunately, however, the narrative is broken down into a
series of scenes, giving it "flimsiness and incoherent texture" (Williams, p. 239), while the protagonist has his fate
"uniformly determined by the agency of the subordinate persons" "evolving themselves" free from demands of plot (Williams, p. 240). Scott's experimentation in his own novels
and comments on them show that he never solved, to his own
satisfaction, the formal problem of presenting convincing detail within an organized plot.
The second technique of verisimilitude Scott describes institutes a comparison between the author's and reader's powers
of generalization: the reader is won over to the author's
premises because they are internally consistent, or proportional. James Beattie showed that internal consistency lends
probability to the marvellous, that Swift's Lilliputians "may
pass for probable beings" because "every circumstance relating
to them accords with itself, and with their supposed character."41 Scott's comments on Gulliver's Travels (Williams,
pp. 152, 160, 163) follow Beattie's closely, and he adds the
general rule that "proportion forms an essential attribute of
truth, and consequently of verisimilitude, or that which renders a narration probable" (Williams, p. 152). This statement
strains the distinction between verisimilitude and accurate
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representation. Swift's fantasy achieves psychological accuracy, for Gulliver and his hosts "conduct themselves towards
each other precisely as must necessarily have happened" in
reality (Williams, p. 152). Moreover, manipulation of proportion sets vice in its true light, "political intrigue ••• ridiculed by being transferred to a court of creatures about six
inches high," and "female levities, and ••• lighter follies •••
rendered monstrous and disgusting" by being drawn on a giant
scale (Williams, p. 152). Shakespeare's supernatural beings
hover near factuality, gifted with "such attributes as all
readers •.• recognized as those which must have corresponded to
such extraordinary beings" (Williams, p. 97). After all, the
two techniques of verisimilitude are merely applications to
the conduct of narrative of the principles of thought, factgathering and class-building, which establish truth when exercised on reality.
Much of Scott's criticism of the novel is directed toward
the process by which it achieves or apes intellectual discovery. When a work of fiction instructs by different means,
Scott is at a loss. Swift, for example, sets up clashes between what Scott would call the generic and the individual,
between narrative proportion and detail, with his Houyhnhnms
threading needles and Gulliver pleading innocent to enjoying
a Lilliputian lady. Such clashes Scott sees only as errors
(Williams, p. 163). Swift, writing a determined attack on
modern thought, aims to baffle his reader's rational quest for
knowledge and chasten his faith in scientific method; Scott is
left searching the Travels for 'straight' representations of
human behavior. He is inadequate as a reader of Swift's i rony 42
because he is an inveterate modern, relying on generalization
and particularization as complementary--not contradictory.
One element of fiction is free of intellectual demands.
Scott, we have seen, credits romance only with aesthetic effect, and ignores the question of how romantic plotting or
marvellous postulates work in essentially novelistic tales.
In practice, he does not regard most novels as unified wholes,
and adopts different c~iteria to talk about the two kinds of
fiction. The position seems arbitrary, yet we will suggest a
principle behind it. Hume, in defining the limits of ascertainable knowledge, discarded knowledge of causation, arguing
that the causal connection was based on habit and, though useful in daily life, was not provable or logically warranted. 43
Scott may view romance, story, or causal structure as a mental
construct analogous to a theory of causation, and so value it
for its practical aid and effect on passions and emotions, yet
reject it as a contribution to the search for truth. Certainly, the fiction Scctt studied readily tolerated inconsistencies in plot: the monstrous accumulation of children and
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lovers in Moll Flanders, for instance, will never do as a unified significant action; and the elaborate causal structure
of Tom Jones is presented with such arch playfulness that
thoughtful readers may prefer to follow it as a rhetorical
structure rather than a serious causal explanation. 44 In this
regard Scott is a naive critic, gazing through the lens of
fiction as if it were air, never inquiring how it distorts
what lies on the other side, and never examining the arranged
nature of the whole tableau. The means by which to do these
~~ere as yet undiscovered.
We, however, in possession of these
1I'.eans, should not let them distract us entirely from an important aim of eighteenth-century fiction--and of Scott's fiction--the delineation not of a unified action but of the multifarious transactions of ordinary life to introduce the reader to a complex social world.
Finally we are ready to take up the problem of the moral
influence of fiction. Scott's statements on this issue, too,
seem contradictory at first; he joins his contemporaries in
weighing tales as moral instruction, but he concludes by laughing down the idea that representations of immoral acts will
harm readers. First, in a defense of Pamela, he excludes the
moral resulting merely from plot:
The direct and obvious moral to the deduced from
a fictitious narrative, is of much less consequence to the public than the mode in which the
story is treated in the course of details. If
the author introduces scenes which excite evil
passions, if he familiarizes the mind of the
readers [sic] with impure ideas, or sophisticates
their understanding with false views of morality,
it will be an unavailing defence, that, in the
end of his book, he has represented virtue as
triumphant. (Williams, p. 23; cf. p. 54)
To "excite passions" belongs to romance; Scott leaves the
pornographer's use of the marvellous to the mercy of the censors. Richardson's plot can be ignored, and his realistic
mode results in a study of innocent Pamela to which the character of lustful Mr. B- is merely an adjunct (Williams, p. 23).
Fielding too is saved by his realism, acquitted not because
Jones suffers for his sins, but because his author paints
"life as it is, with all its shades, and more than all the
lights which i t occasionally exhibits, to relieve them" (Williams, p. 55). These comments tend to demand representations
not completely taken up with the dark side of life; for Smollett's Ferdinand Count Fathom is such a "complete picture of
human depravity" that virtuous readers find him a "disgusting
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pollution of the imagination." while the vicious may adopt
him as an instructive example (Williams. p. 60). Even so,
Scott does not argue that the portrait will corrupt the innocent. Instead, it is distasteful. as other delineations of
low life may be by which a reader "may be amused" yet feels
that he is slumming and "must be not a little ashamed of that
which furnishes the entertainment" (Williams. p. 167).
Fiction which "sophisticates ••• with false views of morality" seems to be that which is based on wrong assumptions
about human nature. so that its representations would cause,
not emulation of evil. but despair or presumption. Swift, for
instance, depicts man as an animal, an idea which "if admitted, would justify or palliate the worst vices" (Williams,
pp. 163-4). The "speculative error" of Robert Bage's rationalist "political and philosophical tenets" (Williams, p. 141)
--not his sexual explicitness 45 _-draws Scott's heaviest fire
in this regard. It is tempting to dismiss the Tory's criticism of an egalitarian democrat. Scott clearly expresses his
scorn for Bage's political propagandizing, especially for his
belief "that revolutions were to be effected. and states governed, by a proper succession of clever pamphlets" (Williams,
p. 139). But this is a mere symptom of the real evil--Bage's
unreasonable rationalism. Applied to the observation of society, this leads Bage into factual accuracy: "[t]he very
vices and foibles of the higher classes in modern times are of
a kind different from what Bage has frequently represented
them" (Williams, p. 141). It also makes him mistake the role
of women in society (Williams, p. 142). At root of both lies
an exclusive reliance on individual reason:
Hermpsprong, whom he produces as the ideal perfection of humanity, is paraded as a man who, freed
from all the nurse and all the priest has taught,
steps forward on his path. without any religious
or political restraint. as one who derives his own
rules of conduct from his own breast, and avoids
or resists all temptations of evil passions, because his reason teaches him that they are attended
with evil consequences. (Williams. p. 142)
Scott demands, "But did such a man ever exist?" (Williams,
p. 142) How can his author imagine that one may cast off all
habits gained in nurture? Are not the ancient philosophers
(and Fielding's Mr. Square) instructive demonstrations of the
ethical inefficacy of the rule of right reason? and how does
Hermsprong differ from the religious fanatic who. "referring
his course of conduct to the action of some supposed internal
inspiration. conceives himself ••• incapable of crime. even when
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he is in the very act of committing it" (Williams, p. 143)7
We sometimes think of a priori reason as the method of the
Enlightenment, and of appeals to tradition and the individual
as Romantic. These categories, if they work at all, do not
work for Scott, whose respect for past experience and the exof the individual is in the tradition of the British
Enlightenment, being founded upon reason as a means to free,
wide-ranging but self-aware investigation. Bage would select
his facts and ignore the limits of reason in the face of man's
passions on the one hand and the complexities of his social
institutions on the other; therefore, his doctrinaire rationalism is a "sophistry" (Williams, p. 144). Readers who as
they read
accept the author's "postulates" and
adapt themselves to his "mode" of treating his subject, will
acquire a brief practice in wrong thinking from Bage.
Still Scott is only annoyed, not frightened. His calmness
in the face of immoral literature provoked Lockhart, reviewing
The Lives
the Novelists, who noted Scott's confidence in
the value of novels and concluded triumphantly that "if they
may be thus powerful for good, we fear it follows, as an unavoidable consequence, that they may be equally powerful for
evil."1t6 Not necessarily. Romances may prompt generous emotions, and novels "may sometimes instruct the youthful mind by
real
of life," but their primary function is "mere
elegence and amusement" (Williams, p. 54). This view does not
denigrate fiction unfairly. If even in ethics observation and
deduction
our knowledge, then the representations of
novels must compete with real life for the reader's belief. 1t7
He will learn from what he can bring into his own deductive
categories, and will discard the anomalous and incongruous.
Thus the moral value of books depends partly on the reader's
associations:
Robinson Crusoe produces the same impression upon
an adventurous spirit which the Book of Martyrs
would do on a young devotee, or the Newgate Calendar
upon an acolyte of Bridewell ••.• (Williams, p. 183)
Readers of Swift will find the Houyhnhnms and Yahoos too
"gross and improbable" and inconsistent to believe--unless
they already share Swift's "gloomy misanthropy" (Williams,
p. 164). Skillful technique effects little, for
men are aware that every case may be argued on
both sides, and seldom render their assent to any
proposition merely on account of the skill with
which it is advocated, or the art and humor with
which it is illustrated. (Williams, p. 139)
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The Novelist's Library preserved works based on principles
which "if acted upon, would introduce vice into society"
(Williams, p. 144); all because the "Editor ..• was never one of
those who think that a good cause can suffer much by free discussion" (Williams, p. 139). This idea too we recognize as a
legacy of the Enlightenment, perhaps its greatest--the reasoned defense of freedom.
Although we have insisted that Scott's critical thought is
coherent, it is of course used exclusively in specific readings and literary history. Indeed, it renounces the attempt
to dictate with general descriptions, supposedly exhaustive
taxonomies or defenses which assign goals to the genre, and
insists only that the fiction writer's methods be consistent
with his own primary goals. Scott's theory made possible the
freedom, versatility and good nature of his practical criticism because it allowed explicitly for sympathetic attention
to the aims of different kinds of works--it welcomes new departures, whether or not their final tendencies for the genre
are apparent, it distinguishes literary effects within works
and treats them differently, and it shields works from demands
they cannot meet. This pioneering approach was thus singularly adapted to encourage the flourishing young novel, and in
the modifications (and occasional perversions) of liberal
criticism it continued to serve the mature form. A searching
inspection of the original framework may be useful now that
new sources of elaboration and qualification have become
available, to see if it can help prop an aging genre.
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